Copyright—Procudure for Perfecting—Time of Deposit of Copies by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 3 
January 1939 
Copyright—Procudure for Perfecting—Time of Deposit of Copies 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Copyright—Procudure for Perfecting—Time of Deposit of Copies, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 420 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss3/14 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
The instant case is another example of the reluctance of the courts to
extend protection outside the copyright law to architects' creations.1 0 The
plans of an architect being a suitable subject for copyright, 17 it would seem
that the only sure protection which an architect can get for his creations
will have to come from compliance with the copyright law itself or from
legislation.' s  D. L.
COPYRIGHT-PROCEDURE FOR PERFECTING--TImE OF DEPosiT or CoPIEsm -
[United States] -Petitioner published an issue of its magazine with due
notice during December, 1931, but did not deposit copies until fourteen
months later. In the meantime, respondent reproduced some of the mate-
rial. In an infringement suit for injunction and damages, the Supreme
Court held for petitioner, rejecting respondent's contention that despite the
unquestioned validity of the copyright, no right of action existed because
of tardiness in complying with the statutory deposit provisions.'
Securing a copyright requires publication with notice as set out in the
statute.2 Two copies of the copyrighted work must be deposited promptly
with the Register of Copyrights, and "no action shall be maintained for
infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this act with
respect to the deposit of copies * * * have been complied with."a
Although scattered dicta uttered by lower federal courts 4 had indicated
a view contrary to the position taken in the prinicipal case, the question
remained one of first impression. The majority opinion held that copyright
vested following publication and that an action was maintainable immedi-
ately upon the deposit of copies, despite intervening delay. The bases for
the decision were several: The wording of the act vests the copyright upon
Fed. 54; Jeweler's Merc. Agency v. Jeweler's Pub. Co. (1898) 155 N. Y.
241, 49 N. E. 872, 63 Am. St. Rep. 666, 41 L. R. A. 846; Universal Film
Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914); American Code Co. v.
Bensinger (C. C. A. 2, 1922) 282 Fed. 829.
16. Larkin v. Pennsylvania R. R. (Sup. Ct. 1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 238,
210 N. Y. S. 374; Mackay v. Ben Franklin Realty & Holding Co. (1927)
228 Pa. 207, 135 Atl. 613, 50 A. L. R. 1164; Note (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. R.
458.
17. Ladas, International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property(1938) 718.
18. Note (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1419.
1. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson (1939) 59 S. Ct. 397.
2. (1909) 35 Stat. 1077, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 9.
3. (1909) 35 Stat. 1078, as amended by (1914) 38 Stat. 311, (1927) 17
U. S. C. A. sec. 12.
4. See Maddux v. Grey (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 441; Daven-
port Quigley Expedition v. Century Productions, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1937) 19 F. Supp. 30, aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 93 F. (2d) 489, cert. denied
Century Productions, Inc. v. Patterson (1938) 303 U. S. 655; Freedman v.
Milnag Leasing Corporation (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 802. That
such a view is the proper one is indicated in 13 C. J., Copyrights and Liter-
ary Property (1917) 1064, sec. 175; Admur Copyright Law and Practice
(1936) 518.
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publication with notice and does not make the deposit of copies a condition
precedent; nor is prompt deposit a prerequisite to suit. A suit may not be
maintained "until" the deposit; but, the court makes it clear, lack of prompt-
ness shall not cause "forfeiture of the right theretofore directly granted."
Had "unless" been used rather than "until" the result would have been
different. Support for the decision was found in other sections of the act.
The penalty for tardy deposit to be imposed at the instance of the register
was believed to be a sufficient sanction exclusive of others.5 Immateriality
of the deposit provision was said to be demonstrated by the sections pro-
viding for destruction and removal of deposited copies in the discretion of
the register 6 and for renewal of the copyright even though the deposited
copies had been destroyed.7
The problem presented is essentially one of ascertainment of legislative
intent in enacting the statute. The phraseology of the statute is not clear.
Resort to prior statutes would seem to indicate that deposit of copies within
a designated period always had been a condition precedent to the acquisi-
tion of a copyright.8 This phase of the law was altered because its rigidity
worked hardship.9 However, the fact that no intention was entertained to
abolish the requirement of prompt deposits as a condition of maintaining
suit is manifested by the continued maintenance of the files of copyrights
already granted to enable public inspection") and to supply the Library of
Congress."
None of the provisions of the present copyright law relied upon as bases
for the court's decision would seem to warrant departure from a statutory
policy of many decades. The act speaks of deposit "promptly." Comparable
requirements in prior statutes had made the actual vesting of copyright
depend on deposit within periods ranging up to several months.12 Non-
compliance with the statute on which the copyright owner is entirely de-
pendent for his rights should withdraw its protection from him. A deter-
mination as to whether the deposit was prompt certainly should have been
made. Inasmuch as "promptly" has usually been held to mean "within a
reasonable time,""3 it might well have been concluded that fourteen months
was too long a period.
5. (1909) 35 Stat. 1078, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 13.
6. (1909) 35 Stat. 1087, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 59; (1909) 35 Stat.
1087, (1927) U. S. C. A. sec. 60.
7. (1909) 35 Stat. 1080, 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 23; (1909) 35 Stat. 1080,
1088, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 24.
8. In order to complete the copyright, deposit had to be made as follows:
Act of May 31, 1790, within six months; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, within three
months; Act of July 8, 1870, within ten days; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, on or
before publication. Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 519.
9. (1909) H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
10. Copyright Office Bulletin No. 15 (1926) sec. 24.
11. (1909) 35 Stat. 1087, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 59.
12. Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 519.
13. Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning (1903) 98 Mo. App. 248, 71 S. W.
696: McClesky and Whitman v. Howell Cotton Co. (1906) 147 Ala. 573,
42 So. 67; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Barbour (1921) 206 Ala. 129,
89 So. 299, 17 A. L. R. 103; Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Brady
(1920) 171 Ga. 576, 156 S. E. 222.
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The effect of the instant holding in practice deserves consideration. If
the register is to be assured of getting copies, it must apparently be by
affirmative action on his part under Section 13. Lack of incentive to sub-
mit copies of works until required by the register or until suit is contem-
plated may be expected to result in inaction by many copyright owners.
The dilemma that results is either a serious increase in the register's burden
or a detrimental decrease in the notice value of the files. Moreover, a fiscal
problem is involved, for the small fees that must accompany deposits con-
tribute materially to meeting the expenses of the copyright office.
The decision seems open to serious question both upon orthodox princi-
ples of statutory construction and because of its probable practical conse-
quences. C. J. D.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-MOTION TO SECURE COSTS-EFFECT OF NEw FEDERAL
RuLES-[Federal].-In a case in the federal courts, defendant filed a mo-
tion for securing costs. Plaintiff resisted the motion on the ground that the
newly-adopted Rules make no provision for costs and hence such motion is
not available under the present procedure. Rule 12(h) provides: "A party
waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by mo-
tion as hereinbeforel provided, or if he has made no motion, in his answer
or reply * * * ." Held, objection overruled on the ground that the long-
established practice of the district courts in respect to motion for costs can-
not be deemed to have been nullified by indirection in the manner suggested. 2
The power of the federal courts to require security for costs before the
adoption of the new Rules depended upon the existence of a provision there-
for by the state law or a rule of court; without such authority no such
power existed.3 The effect of the adoption of the new Rules on the Con-
formity Act,4 the Equity Rules,5 and the rules of court of each district in
force at the time of the adoption must be established before rulings as to
the problems involved in the instant case can become consistent under the
new procedure. There seems to be a division of opinion as to whether the
Conformity Act and the Equity Rules have been superseded.0 Little has
1. Rule 12(b) provisions for motions directed to (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) im-
proper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Wheeler v. Lientz Manufacturing Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1939) 25 F.
Supp. 939. Accord: Alderman v. Whelan Drug Co., Inc. (D. C. D. C. 1939)
6 U. S. L. Week 869, where third party defendant was held entitled to se-
curity for costs.
3. 5 Longsdorf, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (1929) 175, sec. 1558;
Sermons v. Kansas City Southern Ry. (1926) 11 F. (2d) 671, where it is
said: "In absence of a federal statute or a rule of court upon the subject,
the matter is governed by the state law. * * * it appearing therefore that
there is no rule of court or statute, either state or federal authorizing the
amounts of the motion in this case, the same should be denied."
4. (1872) 17 Stat. 197, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 724.
5. (1842) 4 Stat. 499, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723 et seq.
6. That the Conformity Act has been superseded entirely, see April, 1937,
Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure Appointed
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